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ANIMAL OWNERS IN PENNSYLVANIA ARE NOT AFFORDED AN
ABSOLUTE RIGHT TO KILL THEIR HEALTHY ANIMAL:

COMMONWEALTH V KNVELLER
ANIMAL LAW - CRUELTY TO ANIMALS - DEADLY WEAPON ENHANCEMENT -

The Pennsylvania

Superior Court ultimately determined that the owner of an animal is not afforded the absolute
right to kill the animal and that a deadly weapons sentencing enhancement was an appropriate
addition to the conviction since a firearm was used in the animal's death.
Commonwealth v. Kneller, 999 A.2d 608 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2010).
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THE KNELLER DECISION

On March 24, 2006, a group of teenagers watched as Randy Miller ("Miller") led a dog
into the woods, beat the dog repeatedly with a shovel, and then shot the dog with a gun.' Miller
and the Appellant, Wendy Colleen Kneller ("Kneller"), were brought before the trial court facing
criminal charges. 2 Miller was charged with Terroristic Threats and Cruelty to Animals and
Kneller with Criminal Conspiracy to commit Cruelty to Animals for providing the gun and
asking Miller to shoot her dog, Bouta.3 Kneller raised two defenses to the charges against her.4

1.
Brief for Commonwealth-Appellee at *24, Commonwealth v. Kneller, 971 A.2d 495 (Pa. Super.
Ct. 2009) (No. 1016) 2008 WL 6041552.
2.
Brief for Commonwealth-Appellee at *24.
3.
Id. Criminal Conspiracy is defined in 18 PA. CONS. STAT. § 903(a) (2010):
A person is guilty of conspiracy with another person . .. to commit a crime if with the intent of
promoting or facilitating its commission he:
(1) agrees with such other person ... that they ... will engage in conduct which constitutes such
crime or an attempt or solicitation to commit such crime; or
(2) agrees to aid such other person ... in the planning or commission of such crime or of an
attempt or solicitation to commit such crime.
§ 903(a). Cruelty to animals is defined in 18 PA. CONS. STAT. § 5511(a)(2.1)(i)(A), (iii) (2010). The
relevant sections of the statute states:
A person commits a misdemeanor of the first degree if he willfully and maliciously: (A) Kills,
maims, mutilates, tortures or disfigures any dog or cat, whether belonging to himself or otherwise.
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First, she argued that the killing of Bouta was not malicious because it was in accordance with
the Animal Destruction Method Authorization Law ("Animal Destruction Law").5

Second,

Kneller maintained that Bouta was killed in accordance with the Dog Law 6 because the dog had
bitten her child.
On September 15, 2006, a jury convicted Kneller of Criminal Conspiracy to commit
Cruelty to Animals for asking Miller to kill Bouta and providing him with the gun.8
Subsequently, on October 23, 2006, Kneller was sentenced to serve a term of imprisonment from
six to twelve months, arising from a deadly weapons sentencing enhancement on the crime. 9

(iii) The killing of a dog or cat by the owner of that animal is not malicious if it is accompanied in
accordance with the act of December 22, 1983 (P.L. 303, No. 83), referred to as the Animal
Destruction Method Authorization Law.
§5511 (a)(2. 1)(i)(A), (iii).

4.
Id.
5.
Brief for Kneller-Appellant at *9, Commonwealth v. Kneller, 971 A.2d 495 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2009)
(No. 1016) 2008 WL 6041551. The relevant sections of the Animal Destruction Law are found at 3 PA. CONS.
STAT. §§ 325, 328.2(b) (2010). Section 325 states:
Any policeman or constable .. . or any agent of any duly incorporated society or association for
the prevention of cruelty to animals, is hereby authorized to destroy, or cause to be destroyed, any
animal or animals in his charge, when, in the judgment of such policeman, constable, or agent, and
by the written certificate of two reputable citizens called to view such animal or animals in his
presence,--one of whom may be selected by the owner of the said animal or animals, if he shall so
request,--such animal or animals appears to be injured, disabled, diseased past recovery, or unfit
for any useful purpose.

§ 325.
Section 328.2(b) states "[n]othing in this act shall prevent a person or humane society organization from
destroying a pet animal by means of firearms."
3 PA. CONS. STAT. § 459-501(a) (2010). This section states "[a]ny person may kill any dog which
6.
he sees in the act of . .. pursuing, wounding or attacking human beings ..

.

. There shall be no liability on such

persons in damages or otherwise for such killing." Id. Additionally, section 5511(o.1) of the Cruelty to Animals
statute states that "[t]he provisions of this section shall not supersede the act of December 7, 1982 (P.L. 784, No.
225), known at the Dog Law." 18 PA. CONS. STAT.

§ 5511(o.1) (2010).

7.
Commonwealth v. Kneller, 971 A.2d 495, 496 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2009) [hereinafter Kneller 1]. It is
disputed whether the dog actually bit Kneller's child. Kneller I, 971 A.2d at 499 n.7 (Cleland, J., concurring). The
child was not taken to a hospital and the Pennsylvania State Trooper, who met with Kneller, did not observe the
child. Commonwealth v. Kneller, 999 A.2d 608, 611 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2010) [hereinafter Knelleril].
Kneller II, 999 A.2d at 609.
8.
9.
Id. at 613 n.4, 614 n.5. The deadly weapons sentencing enhancement statute is found at 204 Pa.
Code § 303.10(a)(2), (i) (2010). The relevant section states:
When the court determines that the offender used a deadly weapon during the commission of the
current conviction offense, the court shall consider the DWE/Used Matrix (§ 303.18). An
offender has used a deadly weapon if any of the following were employed by the offender in a
way that threatened or injured another individual:
(i) Any firearm, (as defined in 42 Pa.C.S. § 9712) whether loaded or unloaded[.]
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The trial court, by reading all three statutes together, concluded that an owner does not have an
absolute right to kill his or her own dog.1 0 Moreover, the court determined that Kneller's defense
under the Dog Law failed because Bouta was not killed while in the act of biting her child." The
Animal Destruction Law defense also failed because Bouta was not injured or disabled at the
time of his death.12
Kneller appealed to the Pennsylvania Superior Court raising the issue of whether an
owner has an absolute right to kill a dog by using a firearm, even if the dog is healthy.13 Hearing
the case en banc on January 30, 2009, the court concluded that the relevant statutes do not
prohibit an owner from killing his or her dog, regardless of the reason he or she may have for
doing so. 14 Kneller's conviction was reversed on the grounds that both the Animal Destruction
Law and the Dog Law, when read in conjunction with the Cruelty to Animals statute, were
ambiguous and confusing.' 5 The majority found that one section of the Animal Destruction Law
allows an owner to kill a dog through use of a firearm,1 6 thereby negating the malicious conduct
requirement in the Cruelty to Animals statute. 17 Yet a plain reading of another section allows
only police officers or agents of the state to kill an animal if the animal is first deemed injured or
unfit for any purpose.' 8 Moreover, another section of the Animal Destruction Law authorizes

§ 303.10(a)(2), (i).
10.
Brief for Kneller-Appellant at *7 (citing Trial Court Opinion at 08/14/07 p.15, Carbon County,
No. 267 of 2006).
11.
Brief for Commonwealth-Appellee at *5 (citing Notes of Trial Testimony at 09/15/06 pp.232-234,
Carbon County, No. 267 of 2006).
12.
Id. at *7.
13.
Kneller 1, 971 A.2d at 496.
14.

Id.

15.
Id. at 495. The court noted in a previous decision that ambiguities in a statute "should be
interpreted in a light most favorable to the criminally accused." Commonwealth v. Ryan, 909 A.2d 839, 842 (Pa.
Super. Ct. 2006).
16.
3 PA. CONS. STAT. § 328.2(b) (2010).
17 .
18.

18 PA. CONS. STAT. § 5511(2.1)(iii). (2010).
3 PA. CONS. STAT. § 325 (2010).
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humane societies to dispose of unwanted animals, even if they are healthy.19 With respect to this
section, the majority rejected the Commonwealth's argument that the Animal Destruction Law,
as a whole, only applies to sick and injured animals. 20 Because humane societies can dispose of
unwanted dogs legally through statutory provisions,21 the majority reasoned that it is equally
plausible that the legislature intended that owners can also kill their unwanted dogs, as long as
the killing is not malicious. 22
In reference to the ambiguous nature of the Dog Law, the superior court recognized that
the plain language of the statute allows an owner to kill a dog with violent propensities. 23 The
majority concluded, absent express language in the statute, that violence is only one reason that
an owner can kill a healthy dog, thus giving the Dog Law multiple interpretations and making it
ambiguous to the lay reader and the courts. 24
Judge Cleland, with Judge Musmanno and Judge Gantman joining, filed a concurring
opinion declaring that while Kneller's conviction should be reversed, it should not be because
the laws are ambiguous. 25 Judge Cleland asserted that the Animal Destruction Law authorizes
the method to kill a dog in accordance with the Cruelty to Animals statute, while the Dog Law
discloses the reasons an owner may kill a dog.26 Rejecting the majority view, Judge Cleland

19.
§ 328.6(a). The text of this section reads:
On and after the effective date of this act, a humane society organization or an animal control
organization may apply to the Pennsylvania State Board of Pharmacy for registration pursuant to
the applicable law for the sole purpose of being authorized to purchase, possess and administer
sodium pentobarbital to destroy injured, sick, homeless or unwanted domestic pet animals. Id.
20.
Kneller I, 971 A.2d at 498.
21.
§ 328.6(a). See also 3 PA. CONS. STAT. § 459-102 (2010) (giving definition of "dog control").
22.
Kneller 1, 971 A.2d at 497.
23.
Id. (citing § 459-501(a)).
24.
Id. Although the court recognized that there can be other reasons for an owner to kill a healthy
dog, it did not elaborate on what those reasons may be. Id.
25.
Id. at 499 (Cleland, J., concurring).
26.
Id. at 501. Judge Cleland concluded that the Animal Destruction Law does not establish who can
kill a dog but rather how the dog can be killed. Id.
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stated that the main issue of this case is whether Bouta was killed maliciously. 27 When reading
all three statutes in conjunction, the Animal Destruction Law authorizes the use of a firearm to
kill a dog 28 and the plain language of the Dog Law authorizes an owner to destroy a dog due to
its vicious propensities. 29 As a result, Judge Cleland concluded that the death of Bouta was not
malicious and Kneller's conviction of Criminal Conspiracy to commit Cruelty to Animals should
be reversed.3 0
Judge Stevens dissented to the majority's decision to reverse Kneller's conviction but
agreed with Judge Cleland that the statutes are not ambiguous.31 Judge Stevens stated that Bouta
was maliciously killed because his death was not in accordance with the Animal Destruction
Law. 32 Judge Stevens interpreted the Animal Destruction Law differently, stating that sections
325 and 328.2(a) should be read in conjunction to show that once a dog is deemed unfit for a
purpose, injured, or disabled, an appropriate method to kill the dog is through use of a firearm. 33
During the trial, Kneller failed to provide any evidence that Bouta met one of these
requirements. 34 Furthermore, Judge Stevens noted that the Dog Law cannot serve as a defense
for Kneller because her case does not fit into any of the instances described in the law. 35 He also
explained that clear examples are provided in both the Animal Destruction Law and the Dog
KnellerI, 971 A.2d at 501. Judge Cleland called the majority's comparison of a humane society's
27.
right to kill a dog and an owner's right to kill a dog confusing. Id. In addition, Judge Cleland accepts that Bouta did
actually bite Kneller's child because the Commonwealth offered no proof to dispute Kneller's testimony. Id. at 499.

Superior

28.

3 PA. CONS. STAT.

29.
30.
31.

§ 459-501(a).

§ 328.2(b).

Kneller 1, 971 A.2d at 501 (Cleland, J., concurring).
Id. at 502 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Judge Stevens is now the President Judge of the Pennsylvania
Court.

Judges

of

the

Superior

Court,

www.SUPERIOR.COURT.STATE.PA.US,

http://www.superior.court.state.pa.us/bios.htm (last visited Mar. 8, 2011).
32.
Id at 503. At the time of Bouta's death, he was not injured or unfit for a purpose as demonstrated
in § 325. Id
Id
33.
34.
Id at 502.
35.
KnellerI, 971 A.2d at 503 (Stevens J., dissenting) (citing § 459-501(a)). Judge Stevens stated that
Judge's Cleland's concurring opinion presumes that Bouta actually bit Kneller's child. Id. at 502 n.18. However,
there was only Kneller and her co-defendant's "self-serving testimony" to support that Bouta actually bit the child.
Id. at 504. In finding Kneller guilty, the jury in the trial court denounced Kneller's credibility in this regard. Id.
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Law, and therefore, neither is ambiguous.36 Judge Stevens concluded his opinion by stating that
Kneller violated the Cruelty to Animals statute and that her actions could neither negate malice
in the Animal Destruction Law nor provide her a defense under the Dog Law. 37
Following the superior court's majority decision, the Commonwealth filed a petition for
allowance of appeal to the Pennsylvania Supreme Court.38 In a per curiam order on December
31, 2009, the court granted the appeal, vacated the superior court's order and remanded the case
to the superior court pursuant to Judge Stevens' dissenting opinion. 39
On July 14, 2010, on remand to the Pennsylvania Superior Court, Judge Stevens
submitted his dissenting opinion as the new majority opinion. 40

Additionally, the court

addressed two procedural issues not yet heard on appeal. 4 1 First, Kneller argued that the trial
judge committed error by not instructing the jurors that an owner of an animal has a greater right
to destroy the animal. 42 However, Kneller neglected to cite to any authority or present any
argument supporting such an instruction, and the court concluded Kneller waived her claim to

this issue.4 3
On the second procedural claim, Kneller assigned error to the trial judge's application of

36.
Id. at 503-04.
37.
Id at 504.
38.
Commonwealth v. Kneller, 987 A.2d 716 (Pa. 2009) [hereinafter Kneller III].
39.
Id. The court determined that the facts showed no immediate need to kill Bouta, that Kneller
directed Miller to shoot the dog, that Miller maliciously beat the dog before shooting it and that there was sufficient
evidence to support Kneller's conviction of Criminal Conspiracy to commit Cruelty to Animals. Citing
Commonwealth v. Drumheller, 808 A.2d 893, 907-08 (Pa. 2002), the court noted that because the Commonwealth
originally won the verdict, it was "entitled to have the facts reviewed in the light most favorable to it." Id.
40.
Kneller II, 999 A.2d at 609-12. The new opinion summarized both the majority's opinion and
Judge Cleland's concurring opinion. Id. at 609-11 (citing Kneller 1, 971 A.2d at 495-96; 499-500 (Cleland, J.,
concurring)). He then provided the language from his dissenting opinion. Id. at 610-12 (citing Kneller 1, 971 A.2d
at 503-05 (Stevens, J., dissenting)).
41.
Id at 612.
42.
Id at 612-13 (citing Brief for Kneller-Appellant at * 10, Kneller 1, 971 A.2d 495 (No. 1016)). The
lower court also refused Kneller's request for a specific conspiracy instruction. Id.
43.
Id. at 613. See Commonwealth v. Brougher, 978 A.2d 373 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2009) (claim is waived
when the appellant provides no citation to authority).
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the deadly weapons sentencing enhancement for her crime.44 A challenge to the deadly weapons
enhancement invokes a discretionary review of sentencing. 45 Although Kneller failed to submit
a separate concise statement in her brief regarding the error, the court recognized that a
substantial question existed regarding the deadly weapons enhancement and allowed this claim
to proceed on appeal.46
In reviewing the sentence, the court relied on the Pennsylvania Supreme Court's decision
in Commonwealth v. Hackenberger, which upheld the deadly weapons enhancement in an animal
cruelty case because the crime was not excepted under section 303.10(a)(3) of the Pennsylvania
Code and the appellant admitted to using a rifle to kill the dog. 4 7 Kneller maintained that her
case was distinguishable from Hackenberger in that the dog killed in Hackenberger was not
owned by the shooter, whereas she and Miller were the owners of Bouta.48 The superior court
found no merit in this argument given the clear statutory language of the crime. 49 It also stated
that Kneller's argument was based on her faulty interpretation of the Animal Destruction Law
44.
Id. Kneller agrees with the Commonwealth that the deadly weapons enhancement can apply to the
sentence for a conviction of cruelty to animals, but she maintains that it is not applicable when an owner of the
animal uses a deadly weapon to kill the animal. Id. (emphasis added).
45.
Kneller II, 999 A.2d at 613. In Commonwealth v. Martin, 611 A.2d 731, 735 (Pa. Super. Ct.
1992), this court stated that challenges of sentences are not automatically granted to an appellant. Rather, the
appellant must satisfy four requirements which are:
(1) whether appellant has filed a timely notice of appeal . . . (2) whether the issue was properly
preserved at sentencing or in a motion to reconsider and modify sentence . . . (3) whether
appellant's brief has a fatal defect . . . and (4) whether there is a substantial question that the
sentence appealed from is not appropriate under the Sentencing Code, 42 PA. CONS. STAT. §
978 1(b).
Id. (most internal citations omitted). In order for Kneller to satisfy the fourth requirement, she had to submit a
concise statement in her appellate brief demonstrating that there is a substantial question for the court to answer.
Kneller II, 999 A.2d at 614. In Commonwealth v. Phillips, the court found that a substantial question can be raised
when an appellant argues that her sentence is excessive because of a deadly weapons enhancement. 946 A.2d 103,
112 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2008).
46.
Id. at 614. Under a discretionary review, the standard is abuse of discretion, where the sentence
will not be overturned unless it was "manifestly unreasonable, or the result of partiality, prejudice, bias or ill-will."
Id. at 614 (citing Brougher, 978 A.2d at 376).
47.
Id. at 614-15 (citing Commonwealth v. Hackenberger, 836 A.2d 2, 4-5 (Pa. 2003), where the
appellant used a firearm "in furtherance of the [cruelty to animals] crime" and cruelty to animals was not an explicit
exception under § 303.10(a)(3)).
48.
Id. at 615.
49.
Id. The court referred to section 5511(a)(2.1)(i)(A), which refers to the killing of an animal
"belonging to himself or otherwise." Id

Published by Duquesne Scholarship Collection, 2011

7

Duquesne Criminal Law Journal, Vol. 2 [2011], Iss. 2, Art. 9

70

Duquesne CriminalLaw Journal

Vol. 2:2

and the Dog Law, as she believed that she had an absolute right to kill her dog because she was
its owner.50 As a result, the superior court affirmed the trial court's application of the deadly
weapon enhancement to Kneller's sentence. 5 1
Judge Cleland filed a concurring opinion, in which Judge Bowes joined, warning of the
policy implications of this new decision.52 Judge Cleland cautioned that this decision would put
an owner at risk of prosecution, under the Cruelty to Animals statute, when the owner euthanizes
a dog that presents a risk to society. 53 Judge Cleland concluded the opinion by urging the
legislature to take action to revise the Cruelty to Animals statute, the Animal Destruction Law,
and the Dog Law so that all three can be read clearly and in conjunction with one another. 54
II.

THE HISTORY BEHIND THE KNELLER DECISION

The animal cruelty laws have developed through common sense.55 But regardless of their
apparent plain meanings, sections to the Cruelty to Animals statute have been challenged as
being vague, ambiguous, or overbroad. 56

However, section 5511(a)(2.1) of the Cruelty to

Animals statute, as well pertinent sections of the Animal Destruction Law and the Dog Law,
have remained unchallenged until now.

50.
Kneller II, 999 A.2d at 615.
51.
Id.
52.
Id. (Cleland, J., concurring).
53.
Id.
54.
Id. at 615-16.
55.
Debbie Jugan, What the General PractitionerNeeds to Know About Pennsylvania Animal Law:
Animal Cruelty, 77 PA. B. ASS'N Q. 80, 80 (2006).
56.
See Commonwealth v. Craven, 817 A.2d 451 (Pa. 2003) (holding that section 5511 (h.1)(6) was
not vague or overbroad as to the meaning of a dog fighting spectator); Commonwealth v. Balog, 672 A.2d 319 (Pa.
1996) (holding that section 5511(h.1)(3) was not unconstitutionally vague or overbroad as to owning, selling,
training, or purchasing any animal for animal fighting purposes); Commonwealth v. Barnes, 629 A.2d 123 (Pa.
Super. Ct. 1993) (holding that Section 5511(c) was not unconstitutionally vague as to the neglect of horses and
possible exceptions); Commonwealth v. Gonzalez, 588 A.2d 528 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1991) (holding that section
5511(h.1) was not unconstitutionally vague with as to the meaning of "animal fighting").
57.
Kneller II, 999 A.2d 608.
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Section 5511(a)(2.1) was added to the Cruelty to Animals statute in 1995 and has
undergone only a few amendments since taking effect.58 Before the addition of this subsection,
the statute included a section that made it a crime to kill or injure only another person's domestic
animal.5 9 This particular5 section was at issue in Commonwealth v. Tapper.60 In that case, the
appellant, Jason Tapper ("Tapper"), asserted that he could not be guilty under section
5511(a)(1)(i) because he was the owner of the deceased animal. 6 1 The appellant allowed his
friend's Dalmatian, Duke, to stay at his house for a night in anticipation that he would become
Duke's new owner when the friend moved away.62 While Duke was in Tapper's possession,
Tapper allowed his own pit bull to attack Duke, and then he himself cut off Duke's ears and
tail.63 Although the appellant maintained possession of Duke for a night, the court found that he
was not Duke's true owner, and therefore, he could still be guilty of Cruelty to Animals. 64
Tapper was first decided in the Pennsylvania Court of Common Pleas a few months
before section 5511(a)(2.1) took effect. 65

As a direct result of this case, the Pennsylvania

legislature added this section to the Cruelty to Animals statute to impose strict provisions for
pets, particularly dogs and cats. 66

This section indicates that ownership of the animal is

58.
S. 729, 179th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Pa. 1995). In 2000, the General Assembly amended
section 5511(2. 1)(i) to read "[a] person commits a misdemeanor of the first degree if he willfully and maliciously:"
changing the charge from a misdemeanor of the second degree. S. 1109, 184th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Pa.
2000).
59.
18 PA. CONS. STAT. § 5511(a)(1)(i) (2010). This section reads, "[a] person commits a
misdemeanor of the second degree if he willfully and maliciously: (i) Kills, maims, or disfigures any domestic
animal of anotherperson[.]" Id. (emphasis added). "Domestic animal" includes dogs and cats. § 5511(q) (2010).
60.
675 A.2d 740 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1996).
61.
Tapper, 675 A.2d at 743.
62.
Id. at 741.
63.
Id. There was also evidence that the appellant tied Duke to a tree and taped his mouth shut while
the pit bull attached him. Id.
64.
Id. at 743.
65.
Pa. S. 729. The bill was enacted on July 6, 1995 but effective 60 days after. Id Tapper was
convicted in the Bucks County Court of Common Pleas on January 11, 1995 but sentenced on September 8, 1995.
Commonwealth v. Tapper, 29 Pa. D. & C.4th 25, 26 (Pa. Com. Pl. 1995), affd, 675 A.2d 740 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1996).
66.
Jugan, supra note 53, at 81. See E-mail from Gregg Warner, Counsel, S. Judiciary Comm. to
Erika Farkas, Duquesne Criminal Law Journal (Sept. 15, 2010, 10:28 EST) (on file with author) (stating that
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immaterial as to whether a crime is committed, and it also does not require a duty of care to the
abused animal.67
Section 5511(a)(2.1)(iii) references the Animal Destruction Law as a defense to
malicious conduct.68 Specifically, section 328.2 of the Animal Destruction Law was enacted in
1983 and has not been amended since it came into effect. 69 Within this section, subsection (b)
authorizes any person to use a firearm to kill an animal. 70 The superior court, however, in the
ultimate decision of Kneller's case, concluded that section 328.2(b) should be read in conjunction
with section 325, thereby demonstrating that malicious conduct could not be negated by
following only section 328.2(b). 7 1 As a result, the Kneller court was the first to interpret these
sections of the Animal Destruction Law. 72
Furthermore, courts have never interpreted section 459-501(a) of the Dog Law, which
was relevant to the alleged vicious propensities of Bouta in Kneller.73 This section was added
when the Dog Law was first created in 198374 and enumerates a defense for killing a dog by

Senator Greenleaf and Representative Bruce, both of Bucks County, introduced the addition to the statute following
the national media attention received from the Tapper case).
67.
18 PA. CONS. STAT. § 5511(a)(2.1)(i)(A) (2010). In contrast, section 5511(c) specifically states
"[a] person commits an offense if he wantonly or cruelly illtreats, overloads, beats, otherwise abuses any animal, or
neglects any animal as to which he has a duty of care, whether belonging to himself or otherwise[.]" § 5511(c)(1)
(emphasis added).
68.
§ 5511(a)(2.1)(iii).
69.
H.R. 350, 167th Gen Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Pa. 1983).
70.
3 PA. CONS. STAT. § 328.2(b) (2010).
71.
Kneller II, 999 A.2d at 610. See § 325 (2010) (authorizing a police officer to make a
determination as to whether an animal is injured, diseased, or unfit for its purpose before killing it). Judge Stevens,
on behalf of the majority, interpreted these sections together, saying that first a police officer had to make the
determination that the animal was disabled or unfit for its purpose, and then any person may kill the animal by
firearm, negating the malicious conduct under the Cruelty to Animals statute. Kneller II, 999 A.2d at 610.
Id.; § 328.2(b).
72.
§ 459-501(a).
73.
74.
H.R. 1459, 166th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Pa. 1982). Section 459-501(a) was amended in 1996
to include "pursuing, wounding" in relation of a dog attacking a human being. H.R. 397, 180th Gen. Assemb., Res.
Sess. (Pa. 1996).
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providing examples of behavior that would warrant the lawful destruction of the animal.7

Such

information is not explicitly stated in the Cruelty to Animals statute. 76
Although both the Animal Destruction Law and the Dog Law establish defenses to
crimes contained within the Cruelty to Animals statute, using a firearm to kill a dog for any
reason not excepted in these laws is a crime.77 In instances where a firearm is used outside of the
animal protection laws, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court has further punished the offender's
conduct by applying a deadly weapons enhancement to the sentence of an animal cruelty
conviction.

In Commonwealth v. Hackenberger, the appellant, Bradley Hackenberger

("Hackenberger"), fired five shots and killed a dog after he believed the animal was rabid and
had attacked his own pet. 79 In convicting the appellant of Cruelty to Animals,80 the trial court
applied the deadly weapons enhancement to his sentence.

The superior court affirmed the

conviction82 and appellant appealed to the Pennsylvania Supreme Court, arguing that the deadly
weapons sentencing enhancement cannot apply to cruelty to animal convictions.83 On appeal,
the court found that the deadly weapons enhancement provision can be used whenever the
offender possesses a deadly weapon, including a firearm, during the commission of the crime. 84

75.
§ 459-501(a). The end of the section reads "There shall be no liability on such persons in damages
or otherwise for such killing." Id. The Cruelty to Animals statute in section 5511(o.1) does not permit any
provision of the statute to supersede any section of the Dog Law. 18 PA. CONS. STAT. § 5511(o.1) (2010).
76.
§ 5511.
§ 5511(a)(2.1)(iii), (o.1).
77.
78.
Commonwealth v. Hackenberger, 836 A.2d 2, 5 (Pa. 2003).
79.
Hackenberger, 836 A.2d at 3.
80.
§ 5511(a)(1)(i).
81.
Hackenberger, 836 A.2d at 3. Hackenberger's conviction under section 5511(a)(1)(i) was a
misdemeanor of the second degree which normally carried no jail time. Id. However, by applying the enhancement
to the sentencing, Hackenberger received a prison sentence of six months to two years. Id.
82.
Id. The court stated that the plain language of the deadly weapons enhancement provision allowed
it to extend to cruelty to animal convictions because § 303. 10(a)(2) states "[a]n offender has used a deadly weapon if
any of the following were employed by the offender in a way that threatened or injured another individual or in
furtherance of the crime[.]" Commonwealth v. Hackenberger, 795 A.2d 1040, 1047 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2003) (emphasis
added).
83.
Hackenberger, 836 A.2d at 3.
84.
Id. at 3-4. See 204 Pa. Code § 303.10(a)(2) (2010). The court specifically cited that the
enhancement applied when the appellant used the firearm "in furtherance of the crime." Id (citing § 303.10(a)(2)).
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While the appellant maintained that the sentencing enhancement only applied to crimes against
other persons, the court dismissed this argument through a plain reading of the exceptions listed
in section 303.10(a)(3) of the Pennsylvania Code.8 5 The court applied the deadly weapons
sentencing enhancement because cruelty to animals was not listed as a specific exclusion and it
affirmed the appellant's conviction and sentence. 86
Justice Castille dissented from the majority opinion in Hackenberger by adopting the
dissenting opinion of then President Judge Del Sole of the Pennsylvania Superior Court.

In his

dissent, President Judge Del Sole stated that the plain language of the deadly weapons
enhancement provision applies only to crimes against other persons; therefore, the provision
should not have applied in a cruelty to animals conviction."

Subsequently, the legislature

narrowed the applicability of the deadly weapons enhancement in 2005.89
III.

AN ANALYSIS OF THE KNELLER DECISION

As a result of the superior court's amended decision, an owner of a dog or cat does not
have an absolute right to kill his or her pet. 90

Following Commonwealth v. Tapper, the

legislature added section 5511 (a)(2. 1) to the Crimes Code to clarify that an owner can still be

85.
Hackenberger, 836 A.2d at 4. Under § 303.10(a)(3), specific exceptions are listed to show when
the deadly weapons enhancement does not apply. 204 Pa. Code § 303.10(a)(3) (2010). Most of these exceptions
include possession of a deadly weapon as an element of the convicted crime, but can also include simple and
aggravated assaults. Id.
86.
Hackenberger, 836 A.2d at 5.
87.
Id. (Castille, J., dissenting). President Judge Del Sole retired from the Pennsylvania Superior
Court in 2006.
P.JE. Del Sole Retires from Bench, www.SUPERIOR.COURT.STATE.PA.US,
http://www.superior.court.state.pa.us/CourtNews/PJE%/o20Retirement.pdf (last visited Nov. 12, 2010).
88.
Id. (citing Commonwealth v. Hackenberger, 795 A.2d 1040, 1048 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2002) (Del Sole,
P.J., concurring and dissenting). The language of the provision states "[a]n offender has used a deadly weapon if
any of the following were employed by the offender in a way that threatened or injured another individual or in
furtherance of the crime[.]" § 303.10(a)(2) (emphasis added).
89.
35 Pa. Bull. 1508 (Feb. 9, 2005). The legislature removed the language "in furtherance of the
crime" in § 303.10(a)(2), which the court relied upon in affirming the enhancement provision in Hackenberger. Id.;
See Hackenberger, 836 A.2d at 4.
90.
Kneller II, 999 A.2d at 612.
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While the superior court's new decision is logical, its

original analysis of the amalgamation of the relevant statutes was flawed. Section 5511(a)(2.1)
of the Pennsylvania Crimes Code references the Animal Destruction Law as a way to negate the
malicious conduct of cruelty to animals. 92 In addition, the Crimes Code references the Dog Law
as superior authority to the Cruelty to Animals statute. 9 3 Thus, the Crimes Code indicates the
proper cross-references to other relevant statutes, leaving the court's original analysis of the
Animal Destruction Law and the Dog Law problematic.
Ultimately, the superior court properly concluded that none of the relevant statutes were
ambiguous; however, the Animal Destruction Law is hardly clear. Indeed, the superior court
initially struggled to find the logic in reading sections 325 and 328.2(b) together. 94 The court
stated that it would be impossible to expect a layperson to conclude that these sections of the
statute should be read together when there is no indication that the legislature intended this. 95 In
fact, the court only speculates to the legislative intent of the statutes because these statutes were
never previously contested.96 Judge Cleland, in his original concurring opinion, indicated that it
is ideal to read the Crimes Code, the Animal Destruction Law, and the Dog Law together. 97 But
he failed to address which sections of the Animal Destruction Law should be read in conjunction

91.
See E-mail from Gregg Warner, Counsel, S. Judiciary Comm. to Erika Farkas, Duquesne Criminal
Law Journal (Sept. 15, 2010, 10:28 EST) (on file with author) (stating that Senator Greenleaf and Representative
Bruce, both of Bucks County, introduced the addition to the statute following the national media attention received
from the Tapper case).
92.
18 PA. CONS. STAT. § 5511(a)(2.1)(iii) (2010).
93.
§ 5511(o.1).
94.
Kneller 1, 971 A.2d at 497. The Commonwealth argued that because section 325 comes before
section 328.2 in the statute, they should be read in conjunction. Brief for the Commonwealth-Appellee, at *7.
Id.
95.
96.
Id. See also 3 PA. CONS. STAT. § 328.2 (2010) (citing no previous case law or amendments
explaining the statute).
97.
Id. at 499 (Cleland, J., concurring).
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with one another, 98 and he believed that section 325 gave an owner unlimited authority to kill his
or her dog. 99
The superior court's en banc Kneller opinion concluded that sections of the Animal
Destruction Law can be read together.100 Judge Stevens indicated that section 328.2(b) provides
the way to kill a dog, while section 325 indicates when a person can kill a dog.101 But the court
struggled to address how a lay-person would be expected to know that these two sections are
related and that they should be read in conjunction with one another.
Furthermore, the original majority's interpretation of the Dog Law was equally
confusing.

In its opinion, the majority concluded that the relevant sections of the Dog Law

provide another possible interpretation of an owner's right to kill his or her dog. 0 2 When
combining the relevant sections of the Dog Law with the relevant sections of the Animal
Destruction Law, the majority concluded that there were too many possible interpretations to
determine the legislative intent, and therefore, the statutes were both ambiguous.

103

However,

Judge Stevens, in the new majority opinion, properly deciphered the previous majority's
confusion. Judge Stevens concluded that the Animal Destruction Law contains one defense,
which negates the malicious conduct of an owner when killing a dog that was determined to be
injured or unfit for a purpose.104 The Dog Law provides another defense by allowing an owner
to kill a healthy dog only if the dog is found to have pursued or wounded another animal or a

98.
Id. at 501 (making no reference to the relation between sections 325 and 328.2).
99.
Kneller 1, 971 A.2d at 501(Cleland, J., concurring).
100.
Kneller II, 999 A.2d at 610.
101.
Id. (citing §§ 325, 328.2(b)).
Kneller 1, 971 A.2d at 497. The court stated that the Dog Law allows an owner to kill his or her
102.
dog if the animal "demonstrates vicious tendencies[.]" Id.
103.
Id.
104.
Kneller II, 999 A.2d at 610. Judge Stevens made this conclusion by reading sections 325 and
328.2(b) together. Id.
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The two statutes provided different defenses that could be used by a defendant

depending on the facts of his or her case. Kneller raised both defenses when arguing her right to

kill her dog.1 06
Judge Cleland, in his original concurring opinion, applied these separate defenses to
reverse Kneller's conviction on the assumption that Bouta actually bit Kneller's child, giving her
a reason under the Dog Law and a method to kill the dog under the Animal Destruction Law.107
But the jury in the trial court ultimately determined that there was insufficient evidence that
Bouta bit Kneller's child when they convicted Kneller. 08

Interestingly, if the jury had

determined that Bouta did bite the child, it may have applied the Dog Law defense to Kneller,
therefore finding her not guilty of the cruelty to animal charge and giving this case an entirely
different interpretation. Even without this speculation, Judge Cleland correctly indicated that the
statutes involving cruelty to animals need to be revised so that they may be properly understood
by the public and applied by the courts.

109

The legislature cannot expect statutes to be read

together when those statutes are difficult to interpret even when standing alone.
Although Kneller's case was decided in a roundabout way, by reading the statutes in
conjunction with one another, the superior court ultimately arrived at a decision that would not
only safeguard animals, but would also protect society as a whole. Judge Stevens noted the
ramifications of allowing an owner to kill his or her dog for any reason.11 0 If the court were to
grant owners of an animal such broad authority, it might allow such individuals to buy numerous

105.
Id. at 610-11. The last sentence of section 459-501(a) reads "[t]here should be no liability on such
persons in damages or otherwise for such killing." § 459-501(a). While "no liability" indicates a civil action for
damages for the death of dog, the phrase "or otherwise" indicates this section can also be used as a defense in
criminal actions as well.
106.
Id. (citing from Kneller 1, 971 A.2d at 503-04 (Stevens, J., dissenting)).
107.
Kneller 1, 971 A.2d at 499 (Cleland, J., concurring).
108.
Kneller II, 999 A.2d at 611.
109.
Id.at 615-16 (Cleland, J., concurring).
110.
Id.at 612 (majority opinion).
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dogs, take the dogs home, and instantly shoot and kill the dogs without suffering any criminal
consequences.II

It seems unlikely that the legislature or the court would want to encourage such

action, especially when an owner of an animal can face criminal charges for neglect by simply
failing to provide the animal with proper food and sufficient water. 112
Even though the superior court properly found Kneller guilty of Criminal Conspiracy to
commit Cruelty to Animals, the court faltered in its application of the deadly weapons sentencing
enhancement to Kneller's sentence.

Commonwealth v. Hackenberger was decided in 2003,

almost seven years before Kneller's case.11 3

The Hackenberger court relied upon section

303.10(a)(2), particularly the phrase "in furtherance of the crime" to apply the deadly weapons
enhancement.11 4

However, nearly five years before Kneller's case was decided, the

Pennsylvania General Assembly removed "in furtherance of the crime" from the statute to limit
the enhancement's applicability.'5 Without this phrase, the deadly weapons enhancement seems
to only apply when an offender uses a deadly weapon to threaten or injure another person.
When the superior court addressed the deadly weapons enhancement in Kneller, it failed
to even inquire into the statutory language of the provision. Instead, it relied solely on the
Pennsylvania Supreme Court's decision in Hackenberger, even citing "in furtherance of the
crime" as a basis for its analysis.11 6 In fact, the court only looked at the Hackenberger majority
opinion.

It neglected to consider Justice Castille's dissenting opinion, which Chief Justice

111.

Id.

112.
Brief for Commonwealth-Appellee, at *8. See also 18 PA. CONS. STAT. § 5511(c)(1) (2010)
(stating the necessary elements for a criminal charge of cruelty to animals when the owner neglects or abuses his or
her pet).
113.
Hackenberger, 836 A.2d at 2.
114.
Id. at 4. At the time of sentencing, section 303.10(a)(2) stated that the offender used a deadly
weapon if he or she "threatened or injured another individual or in furtherance of the crime[.]" § 303.10(a)(2)
(emphasis added). In Hackenberger,there was no threat to another individual for the cruelty to animals conviction,
so the court had to rely on the "in furtherance of the crime" phrase to apply the deadly weapons enhancement. Id.
115.
35 Pa. Bull. 1508 (Feb. 9, 2005).
116.
Kneller II, 999 A.2d at 614.
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Cappy joined, and from which Justice Castille quoted President Judge Del Sole's dissenting
opinion in the superior court.
In President Judge Del Sole's dissent, he argued that the enhancement provision can only
apply when a deadly weapon is used against another person. "7 He makes this analysis at a time
when the "in furtherance of the crime" phrase was still included in the provision. With the
General Assembly's restriction on the enhancement a few years later, it is even more apparent
that the provision should apply only when using a deadly weapon to threaten or harm another
individual.

Consequently, the superior court's decision to include a deadly weapons

enhancement to Kneller's sentence was error.
In conclusion, without a significant overhaul of the cruelty to animal statutes, this case
will likely be interpreted in many ways by Pennsylvania courts in the future.

As the

interpretation of the Animal Destruction Law stands now, an owner of an animal may only kill
the animal with a firearm if the animal is deemed unfit or injured by a police officer or
authoritative figure in society.118 Moreover, the current interpretation of the Dog Law allows a
person to kill a dog only if there is sufficient evidence showing that the dog previously attacked
or wounded another person or animal.119 Outside of these defenses, an owner or any other
person can be charged with cruelty to animals for killing a dog.

However, there may be

circumstances that the legislature has not yet contemplated that will arise in the future and will
challenge the laws as they currently stand. The addition of section 5511(a)(2.1) substantially
limited an owner's discretion to do as he or she wishes with a pet. Further revisions to the
statutes are necessary to ensure that readers understand the statutes' interrelatedness. The simple
117.
Hackenberger, 836 A.2d at 5 (Castille, J., dissenting).
118.
Kneller II, 999 A.2d at 610 (indicating that sections 325 and 328.2(b) should be read in
conjunction).
119.
Id. at 611. See also 3 PA. CONS. STAT. § 459-501(a) (2010) (indicating the events that must occur
before a person has a right to kill a healthy dog).
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addition of cross references between and within the three statutes would both better inform pet
owners of their rights and would provide additional justice for animals.
Erika Farkas
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